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I. CONFIGURING RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS IN AMERICAN LEGAL 
HISTORY 
In thinking about the status of Southern slave women newly freed 
in the antebellum North, it is important to think about the ways in which 
they experienced race, gender, and class.  According to Deborah Gray 
White, “[they] were slaves because they were black, and even more than 
sex, color was the absolute determinant of class in antebellum 
America.”1  These women were “[black] in a white society, slave in a 
free society, woman in a society ruled by men [as] female slaves [they] 
had the least formal power and were perhaps the most vulnerable group 
∗ Bernie D. Jones is Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Adjunct Assistant 
Professor, Department of History, University of Massachusetts-Amherst.  Acknowledgements and 
thanks to:  Daniel A. Perrault, F. Michael Higginbotham, Professor Tracy A. Thomas and the 
organizers of the Oct. 19, 2007 Women’s Legal History Symposium at the University of Akron 
School of Law; Professor Stephen Middleton, Department of History, Mississippi State University; 
Professor Nikki M. Taylor, University of Cincinnati Department of History; the University of 
Massachusetts-Amherst Department of Legal Studies faculty colloquium, especially Alan Gaitenby 
and Diana Yoon;  Professor Laura Lovett, Department of History, University of Massachusetts-
Amherst, and the members of her graduate seminar in women’s history. 
 1. DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN:  FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION 
SOUTH 15 (1999). 
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of antebellum Americans.”2  This was their reality, as a result of cultural 
and social practices founded in law.  Legal elites developed as far back 
as the colonial period, a law of slavery based upon hierarchical notions 
of humanity seen as “natural.”  Blacks were inferior to whites, and it was 
natural that they should be enslaved, as a matter of organic law.  
Southern social and economic demands necessitated this legal order.3 
In order to conceptualize race, gender, and class in American legal 
history today, it is important, first of all, to explain and discuss these 
topics within the contours of American legal thought.  Race, gender, and 
class can be indicators of hierarchy and status in American society, 
especially when they are modulated through the institutional practices of 
politics and law.  Within the realm of American legal thought over the 
past century, though, American lawyers have struggled with the extent to 
which they believed the law was indeed about power and politics.  The 
following diagram, figure 1, “American Legal Thought, Late 19th 
Century into Today,” lists the various schools of thought which have 
been significant, and demonstrates the relationships among them.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Univ. of Ga. Press, 1999) (1858). Richard Delgado and Jean 
Stephancic, in building upon their earlier works in critical race theory, i.e., Critical Race Theory:  
The Cutting Edge (Temple Univ. Press, 2nd Ed., 1999), focused in Critical Whiteness Studies:  
Looking Behind the Mirror (Temple Univ. Press, 1997), pp. 1-13, upon the ways in which whites 
historically defined themselves in relation to minority groups.  Under African slavery, whites 
defined themselves in relation to the blacks in their midst.  Blacks as slaves defined the opposite of 
whiteness:  enslaved v. free, black v. white. 
 4. I developed the diagram based upon a study of various histories of American legal 
thought: NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL 
VOYAGE (2000); Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New 
Millennium?, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2002). 
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Classical Legal Thought
(late 19th c., early 20th c.)
 
Sociological Jurisprudence 
(late 19th c., early 20th c.)
Legal Realism 
(early to mid 20thth c.)
Process Theory 
(mid 20th c.)
Legal Liberalism 
(mid 20th c.)
Law and Economics 
(mid 20th c.)
Civil Rights Lawyer 
Historians  
(1960s to 1970s) 
Critical Legal Studies 
(1960s to 1970s) 
Feminist Legal Theory 
(1970s onwards) 
Critical Race Theory 
(1980s onwards) 
Critical Race Feminism 
(1980s onwards) 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, classical legal theorists, 
also known as formalists, believed the law to be beyond the realm of 
politics.  Neutral principles animated judicial decision-making, while 
political considerations remained within the realm of legislatures.  
Judicial actors in the courts had the exclusive role of limiting the 
excesses of this political sphere.  When legislative pronouncements 
infringed upon notions of “natural law,” and for example, compromised 
property rights, threats of “class warfare” loomed in the face of 
regulatory regimes.  Judicial actors were then called upon to intercede 
and shore up the buttresses.5 
With respect to race and gender, this “natural law” presumed a 
universal order of hierarchy: male over female and black over white.  
Females were naturally subordinate to men (as a matter of Biblical 
interpretation) and because blacks were naturally inferior (as a matter of 
Biblical interpretation and logical reasoning) they were thus unequal to 
whites.6  This type of rationale then remained a persistent theme in late 
19th and early 20th century jurisprudence on questions of gender and 
race.  Nonetheless, the hope of civil rights progress and equality 
persisted among those who would challenge discrimination, especially 
pursuant to the equal protection clause of the recently passed 14th 
amendment to the Constitution.7 
 5. For a general history of classical legal thought, see, e.g., WILLIAM  M. WIECEK, THE LOST 
WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:  LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998). 
 6. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 4. DAVID M. GOLDENBERG, THE CURSE OF HAM:  RACE 
AND SLAVERY IN EARLY JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM (2003). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
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Justice Bradley, concurring in Bradwell v. Illinois, thus explained 
why a woman who met all the requirements to practice law could still be 
barred from obtaining a law license, as a matter of policy: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. 
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of 
the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as 
well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that 
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.8 
With respect to the racial discrimination cases, the Court was quite 
clear that segregation was viable.  Justice Brown, writing for the 
majority in Plessy v. Ferguson,9 explained that segregation was a natural 
response based upon racial distinctions and the preferences of each 
group—white and black—not to meet each other on levels of social 
equality.10  Justice Harlan explained in dissent, however, that the 
majority opinion upholding a Louisiana statute requiring segregation in 
public accommodations would lead to a setback in African American 
civil rights: 
If laws of like character should be enacted in the several states of the 
Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, 
as an institution tolerated by law, would, it is true, have disappeared 
from our country; but there would remain a power in the states, by 
sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings 
of freedom, to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the 
basis of race, and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large 
body of American citizens, now constituting a part of the political 
community . . .11 
For Harlan then, Supreme Court pronouncements on civil rights 
questions could not be divorced from their political implications.  Oliver 
Holmes, one of the earliest critics of classical legal thought, explained 
that “behind the logical form [lay] a judgment as to the relative worth of 
and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate 
 8. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). 
 9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 10. Id. at 544. 
 11. Id. at 563. 
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and unconscious judgment . . .”12 meaning that judicial decision-making 
has never relied exclusively upon eternal principles found in natural law, 
but has relied instead upon the pragmatic demands of the day—
economic, social, cultural, political, and so forth.  The followers of 
sociological jurisprudence, as Progressive era lawyers responding to this 
perspective, went further and argued in turn, that science could be used 
to ensure that the best types of legislation would be passed, and that 
judges would thus be enabled to make the best decisions in light of 
pragmatic societal demands.13  In the eyes of the classicalists, these were 
the ones waging class warfare, with their interest in regulatory regimes 
and their rejection of laissez-fair principles in law, as indicated by 
Lochner v. New York, the opinion in which Justice Peckham, writing for 
the majority (with Justice Holmes in the dissent), rejected a New York 
state regulation that limited the number of hours an employee might 
work per week.14  The majority grounded its reasoning in the classicalist 
doctrine of freedom of contract.15 
By the 1930s, the legal realists were quite openly arguing for 
explicit judicial policymaking, in recognition that on some level, politics 
mattered in law.  If judicial decisions can be seen as policy decisions, 
based upon judicial biases or their perceptions of social needs, economic 
interests and political perspectives, why not be open about it?  Thus, the 
legal realist New Deal lawyers spearheaded the rise of an administrative 
state, where legislatures and administrative agencies could work in 
cooperation with a judiciary that saw itself as having an explicit purpose 
in formulating economic policies, as in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,16 
where the Court upheld a minimum wage law to protect working 
women, or aimed to protect the rights of “insular minorities,” according 
to footnote 4 of the Carolene Products decision.17  Justice Stone 
indicated in this latter opinion that the Court was becoming interested in 
protecting the rights of minorities who had traditionally been locked out 
of the political process and who thus had not had recourse to the 
traditional means of protecting their civil rights.18 
This legal realist perspective, which came to be known as “legal 
liberalism,” was clear that judges might act as umpires in negotiating 
 12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT 34 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006). 
 13. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 4; FELDMAN, supra note 4. 
 14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905). 
 15. Id. at 61. 
 16. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 17. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 18. Id. 
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race, gender, and class interests.  This legal liberalism animated Brown 
v. Board of Education,19 a case which had been developed under the 
aegis of legal realist trained lawyers commissioned by the NAACP.  The 
decision was a hallmark of sociological jurisprudence: the plaintiffs’ 
brief relied upon the well known “doll studies” to prove that segregation 
damaged African American children.20  The NAACP’s Charles 
Hamilton Houston, a former student of Felix Frankfurter at Harvard 
once argued that the civil rights lawyer should be a “social engineer.”21 
This legal liberalism, however, did not garner widespread support.  
Herbert Wechsler, as a process theorist, was an early critic of Brown, a 
decision which signified for so many, their hopes that race-based 
stratification would come to an end in the Uni 22
The process theorists were those legal scholars who were troubled 
by legal realism in the 1930s.  If law was only about policy, what 
prevented fascism from gaining sway?  If anything, they believed that 
permitting judges to become policy makers and “legislators” only 
hastened democracy’s demise by eviscerating the barriers between 
judicial and legislative functions.  With judges acting as “legislators,” 
there was no bulwark against legislative excesses because the judicial 
“legislators” only reinforced what the elected legislators did.  By the 
1950s, these process theorists argued that democracy could only be 
protected by reinforcing the boundaries between functions: executive, 
legislative, judicial.23 
For the generation of lawyers and law students who comprised the 
New Left of the 1960s, the processes themselves were “illegitimate” 
insofar as the “processes of democracy” failed to recognize, explicitly, 
the politics of law and the power dynamics which animated them.  
Moreover, the politics of law supported the needs and demands of the 
 19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 20. See Kennth B. Clark, Isidor Chein, & Stuart W. Cook, The Effects of Segregation and the 
Consequences of Desegregation (1952), available at 
http://www.psych.umn.edu/courses/spring06/lippmannb/psy4960/1954socialsciencestatement.pdf. 
 21. See, e.g., Darlene Clark Hine, Black Lawyers and the Twentieth Century Struggle for 
Constitutional Change, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (John Hope 
Franklin & Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL 
LIBERALISM 230, 230-35 (1996) (discussing  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. and its significance for legal 
liberalism in the United States). 
 22. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
22 (1959). 
 23. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 4.  Adherents of law and economics viewed their 
approach as an attempt to reach a “pure” process, through reliance on universal rules, principles of 
economics, in guiding judicial decision-making.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. 
MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW:  FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM (1997). 
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capitalist elite that held power at the expense of the non-elite.  In the 
view of these critics of the law, notwithstanding any legal liberal interest 
in protecting the interests of the disempowered, the law only operated to 
reinforce class-based interests.  These became known as the “crits,” 
short for critical legal studies, their critique of law.24 
Those with a particular interest in the politics of race became 
known as the “race-crits,” critical race theorists, while the “feminist 
legal theorists” focused on gender.  For each of the latter two groups, the 
politics of law meant the traditional disempowerment of women and 
minorities.  Various women scholars of color argued though, that race 
and gender intersected, and that to limit inquiry to “race” or “gender” 
meant the experiences of women of color fell out of the equation, as 
women of color were forced to choose one over the other, never both at 
the same time.25  Yet, a recently published canon of major works in legal 
theory over the past 100 years mentions themes of this 
“intersectionality” as they appear in critical race theory, but does not 
appear to present the larger movement specifically associated with—
critical race feminism—as a significant development within either 
critical race theory or feminist legal theory: “[the] Critical Race Theory 
movement has experienced a wide number of divisions, and has 
spawned a number of spin-off efforts to develop the Critical Race 
Theory approach to other racial, ethnic, and sexual forms of 
domination.”26 
Critical race feminists have long cautioned against tendencies in 
feminist legal theory and women’s history to focus exclusively upon 
women of majority race groups; at the same time, they argue against 
critical race theorists focusing upon race as the exclusive determinant of 
all issues faced by communities of color, to the detriment of gender.  
The intersections among them matters, they have argued: discourses of 
gender cannot ignore race and discourses of race cannot ignore gender.27  
 24. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Robert W. 
Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:  A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641, 641, 643-45 (David Kairys ed., Basic Books 3d ed. 1998). 
 25. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:  A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). 
 26. Kimberlé Crenshaw et al., in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 889, 898 
(David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006).  See also id. at 896 (discussing 
intersectionality). 
 27. See, e.g., Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women’s History and the 
Metalanguage of Race, in “WE SPECIALIZE IN THE WHOLLY IMPOSSIBLE”: A READER IN BLACK 
WOMEN’S HISTORY (Darlene Clark Hine et al. eds., 1995); Elsa Barkley Brown, “What Has 
Happened Here”:  The Politics of Difference in Women’s History and Feminist Politics, in “WE 
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To focus on gender and ignore race means that racial hierarchy can be 
ignored, and the critical race theory focus on race exclusively means that 
gender based differences within communities of color escape scrutiny: 
men can not fully represent women, and it is presumptuous to conclude 
that women of color are represented solely by their race.  The thesis of 
this article is that critical race feminism, then, can be instrumental in 
shaping the contours of “a new women’s legal history.”  Southern free 
women of color in the antebellum North, recently emancipated from 
slavery, can raise implications for this “new face of women’s legal 
history,” where race, gender, and class were not mutually exclusive, but 
were integrally connected. 
Willard Hurst, credited with founding the field of American legal 
history, as a legal realist, was interested in thinking about the ways in 
which law became the means used by businessmen and industry leaders 
to formulate economic change within American society.  Contrary to the 
classical type legal historians who predated him, he believed laws did 
not exist in a vacuum, divorced from their social and economic contexts.  
The law could be discovered “on the ground,” in the arguments lawyers 
made in court, in the advice they gave their clients, or in the strategies 
they pursued, and not just within the court decisions and the doctrines 
formulated by appellate judges.28 
Barbara Y. Welke has argued, though, that Hurstians traditionally 
failed to consider gender and the family when researching and writing 
legal history.29  She once explained that this approach was wrong-
headed.  Women’s historians’ engagement with law had resulted in 
significant developments within legal history.  Thus, she argued that 
legal historians should engage with gender: 
The serious engagement with gender and the legal order reflected in 
women’s history scholarship has done more than simply shine a 
different light on the conditions of freedom in the nineteenth century; it 
has raised a series of fundamental challenges to the task of fully 
understanding law in society . . . First, in writing legal history, we 
ignore individual identity—whether of race, class, gender, or 
sexuality—at our peril.  Second, in writing legal history we must be 
SPECIALIZE IN THE WHOLLY IMPOSSIBLE”: A READER IN BLACK WOMEN’S HISTORY (Darlene Clark 
Hine et al. eds., 1995); ADRIEN KATHERINE WING, CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (2d ed. 
2003). 
 28. See, e.g., Carl Landauer, Social Science on a Lawyer’s Bookshelf:  Willard Hurst’s Law 
and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 18 LAW &  HIST. REV. 59 
(2000). 
 29. Barbara Y. Welke, Willard Hurst and the Archipelago of American Legal Historiography, 
18 LAW & HIST. REV. 197 (2000). 
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conscious of how law and gender, like law, and race, have been 
mutually constitutive.  Law has been central in gender and racial 
formation as gender and race have been in shaping law.  Third, 
dismissing “private” relationships like the family and marriage from 
broader discussions of public policy and state power ignores the 
process by which the law constructs such relationships as private in the 
first place and whose interests that construction serves.30 
This article develops Welke’s theme and proposes that in the field 
of legal history, the analyses can not be limited to “race, gender, or 
class,” but that matrices of race, gender, and class must be considered at 
their intersections, “race, and gender, and class,” where they might shed 
light on the significance of shifting legal modalities.  It explores how 
race, gender, and class as legal policy in the 19th century could be 
crucial for the formation of family and marital relationships in the 
private sphere.  The focus here is upon free women of color living in the 
antebellum North who had been the previously enslaved partners and 
biological children of their owners.  The men made them bequests of 
manumission and property in their wills, because the law of slavery did 
not recognize them as spouses and members of the men’s families.  
Trusts and estates law gave the men a loophole to force societal 
recognition of the women and children.  Their status as slave women in 
the South limited their ability to defend their claims, however.  Denied 
the legal status of white wives and children, moving to northern states 
was crucial for defining them as family members and for ensuring their 
change in class status from object of property to property owner.  Legal 
institutions in northern jurisdictions like Cincinnati, Ohio, were 
instrumental in effectuating this change. 
This study draws upon the methodologies of Hurst, in considering 
how abolitionist lawyers advised their clients and in explaining their use 
of strategy in representing these clients in family law matters.  It also 
considers too, the methodologies of the critical legal historians who 
argued that the ‘Hurstian historians’ focus on what happened “on the 
ground” failed to consider the significance of what happened “above.”  
Appellate courts were instrumental, they argued, in determining legal 
doctrines and formulating in turn, the policies that animated elite 
perspectives on race, gender, and class interests.31 
 
 30. Id. at 202.  See also Bernie D. Jones, When Critical Race Theory Meets Legal History, 8 
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2006) (discussing the significance that critical race theory can 
bring to legal history work). 
 31. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, American Legal History:  Past and Present, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 563, 567 (1984); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 
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This study demands such an approach, because it is impossible to 
understand the strategies taken by an abolitionist lawyer like Jolliffe 
without taking into account the legal regimes his clients lived under.  
The Southern law of slavery, in the eyes of abolitionists, was a legal 
regime in which everything was turned upside down.  Human beings, 
people, were considered property; women were not considered partners 
and wives, even though their reality said otherwise, and biological 
children were not considered progeny under the law.  This was the legal 
order as formulated by state legislatures and reinforced by appellate 
courts.  Strategizing to circumvent such practices and undermine them 
required ingenuity “on the ground” in an attempt to protect owners’ 
prerogatives and the interests of those left behind: their partners and 
children. 
II. AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE ANTEBELLUM UNITED STATES: 
ENSLAVED AND FREE WOMEN FACING THE LAW 
Deborah Gray White in her study of enslaved women in the 
antebellum South explains quite clearly the significance of a critical race 
feminist perspective in American history: 
Race changed the experience of black womanhood.  The rape of black 
women, their endless toil, the denial of their beauty, the inattention to 
their pregnancy, the sale of their children were simultaneous 
manifestations of racism and sexism, not an extreme form of one or the 
other.  For black women, race and sex cannot be separated.  We cannot 
consider who black women [were] as black people without considering 
their sex, nor can we consider who they [were] as women without 
considering their race.32 
White considered the significance of black women’s resistance to 
the oppression they experienced in their lives on a daily basis—fighting 
back when physically abused, refusing to accept verbal abuse, or running 
away, as significant for understanding the perspective on femininity 
developed by black women living under the regime of American 
slavery.33  Aware that the traditional model of white femininity, of a 
woman protected on a “pedestal” did not fit their realities: “They did not 
see aggression and independent behavior as unfeminine,” but saw them 
(1984); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860:  CONSIDERATIONS OF 
HUMANITY AND INTEREST 121 (1981). 
 32. WHITE, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
 33. Id. at 7-8. 
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instead as necessary tools in their arsenals.34  Arguably too, using the 
courts, when they were enabled by law, whether through suits for 
freedom, or when coupled with the benevolence of a late slave owner 
partner or parent, can be seen as another means of resisting perpetual 
enslavement. 
The legal scholarship on strategies of manumission has not tended 
to focus on gender, though.  But the legal scholarship on slavery and 
gender has tended to focus instead on the legal perspectives of interracial 
sex that encouraged the rape of female slaves while punishing black 
men’s sexual contact with white women.  The law of slavery determined 
that the mixed race children of enslaved black women and white men 
would be considered black and enslaved like their mothers, but not free, 
like their fathers.35  Civil rights “lawyer-historians” such as 
Higginbotham have tended to discuss slavery as the beginning of a long-
standing pattern in American law to oppress African Americans as an 
aggregate whole, or to deny black men rights in particular, such as 
access to the franchise when white men routinely had such rights.36  
African Americans were thus constantly threatened by state-sanctioned 
discrimination reinforced by violent means, corresponding with denial of 
their civil rights.  These “lawyer-historians,” inspired to attend law 
school and become lawyers during the civil rights movement, were 
proponents of legal liberalism.  Slavery was their starting point for 
arguing that African Americans had been “discrete and insular 
minorities” throughout the course of American history.  These “lawyer-
historians” inspired in turn, the critical race theorists who were their law 
students in the 1980s.37 
Free women of color living in the North comprised a heterogeneous 
population.  Some were born free, others bought their freedom, or were 
runaways, refugees from slavery in the South.  As Wilma King 
indicates: “the slaveholder’s status, marital and financial, was tangential 
 34. Id. at 8. 
 35. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR:  RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROCESS:  THE COLONIAL PERIOD 40-47 (1978).  See also A. Leon Higginbotham & F. 
Michael Higginbotham, “Yearning to Breathe Free”:  Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor 
of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1243-44 (1993); THOMAS D. MORRIS, 
SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619 – 1860, 22-25 (1996).  Refer also to Delgado and 
Stephancic, supra, note 3, on the significance of “whiteness” in determining this demarcation line. 
 36. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM:  RACIAL POLITICS AND 
THE PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 7-10 (1996). 
 37. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 30, at 10-12, n.2 (discussing A. Leon Higginbotham’s 
significance in contributing to the legal history of African Americans in the United States and 
Derrick Bell’s role as a founder of critical race theory). 
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to the possibilities of emancipation prior to an owner’s death,”38 just as 
the legal rules for manumitting, whether manumission was permitted, or 
not, or whether they were strict or easy, all were important in 
determining manumission strategies.  She notes that “[unmarried] or 
widowed owners of means were more likely to free lovers than persons 
with legally recognized spouses and children, or an interest in avoiding 
scandals.”39  Moreover, “[emancipations] by wills, regardless of the 
deceased owners’ marital status, were subject to challenges by money-
hungry relatives or poverty-stricken heirs or relatives.  It was not 
unusual for courts to overturn manumission decrees.”40 
Because of these factors, some free women of color in the 
antebellum North had been sent by their owners out of South to live as 
free women.  Within this group of free women of color there were 
previously enslaved free women of color who had been the sexual 
partners of the white men who owned them, or their biological children.  
The men had never married, but, in opposition to social and legal 
conventions, lived openly with the enslaved women as though they were 
social equals.  They then recognized the women and children in their last 
wills and testaments, hoping to leave them bequests of freedom and 
property.  The men’s wills, in turn, stirred up discontent among white 
relatives who felt entitled to the property; this made the women fearful 
for their lives.  This fear could propel the women to flee to the North and 
remain there, where they might live in freedom and gain the resources to 
defend their rights to property in the South.  Ohio, bordering the slave 
states of Kentucky and Virginia, was an important destination.  The 
women relied upon lawyers in their new communities, like John Jolliffe, 
who represented their interests in fighting for their inheritance. 
Recent scholarship on this topic of miscegenation and inheritance 
rights in the antebellum South is an example of this new horizon in the 
field of women’s legal history: the complexities to be found in the 
intersections of race, gender, and class status in the law as it affected 
families.41  The law treated different categories of women differently, 
 38. WILMA KING, THE ESSENCE OF LIBERTY:  FREE BLACK WOMEN DURING THE SLAVE ERA 
1, 15 (2006). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Bernie D. Jones, “Righteous Fathers,” “Vulnerable Old Men,” and “Degraded 
Creatures”:  Southern Justices on Miscegenation in the Antebellum Will Contest, 40 TULSA L. REV 
699, 699-750 (2005), an article which is part of a forthcoming book:  Bernie D. Jones, Fathers of 
Conscience:  Mixed-Race Inheritance in the Antebellum South (University of Georgia Press, 
Studies in the Legal History of the South).  Although the focus in this instance is on free women of 
color as the partners and daughters of elite men, it is important to note male children of testators 
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and in the 19th century, slave women experienced the sting of legalized 
discrimination, because they could not be legal wives and had no 
recognizable families that could be protected under law, while white 
women experienced protection as the daughters of white fathers and the 
wives of white husbands.  Lack of protection made slave women 
vulnerable to those who would take advantage of their subordinate 
status, and that could include the men who owned them.  These 
relationships were complex, built upon relationships of inequality and 
hierarchy.  Even though the men tried to help the women and their 
children by mentioning them in their wills, slave women were denied the 
legal status that white women had through marriage. 
Feminist legal theorists and women’s historians have spoken of the 
ways in which white women in the 19th century could experience lack of 
equality in the private sphere of the home and denial of access to rights 
in the public sphere of work and government, for example, through 
coverture, the doctrine that made a married woman civilly dead.42  In the 
view of the early common lawyers, this notion of “separate spheres” 
protected women in each,43 forgetting the possibility that placing women 
under “protection” could leave them vulnerable to abuse, as was argued 
by many suffragists in the late 19th century.  Thus, coverture merged a 
married woman’s legal identity into her husband’s; as the head of the 
household, he owned her property and was responsible for her.  She was 
his dependent.  He could file suit on her behalf, and chastise her in order 
to force her obedience. 
The Married Women’s Property Acts began protecting married 
women’s separate estates, beginning in the 1840s.44  The use of separate 
estates under the Act became the means by which men could ensure that 
their daughters’ property interests were protected.45  A woman could 
could also be claimants.  In all instances, gender mattered though--the identity of their mothers was 
of the utmost significance in their ability to assert their claims:  was she white, a slave woman, or a 
free woman of color? 
 42. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
LAW 24-25 (1989); NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A 
PRIMER 163 (2006). 
 43. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 
BOOK THE FIRST – CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH: OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 433, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk1ch15.htm (last visited July 31, 2007) (“These 
are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which we may obferve (sic), that 
even the difabilities [sic], which the wife lies under, are for the moft [sic] part intended for her 
protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female fex [sic] of the laws of England.”). 
 44. RHODE, supra note 42, at 24. 
 45. PEGGY A. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS:  THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMALE 
EMANCIPATION 21 (1980). 
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become secure from her husband’s creditors; moreover, she could retain 
ownership of an inheritance from her family and her wages if her 
husband was a spendthrift.46  By the mid 19th century then, elite women 
experienced a hybrid status: not fully equal, they were discriminated 
against, yet the claim was that they were protected in various ways.  
Notwithstanding any discrimination white women experienced, it is 
important to note, however, that in comparison to slave women, they 
were relatively privileged.  Slave women were not protected.  They did 
not have the same rights under law that married white women had to 
their husband’s estates, because they did not have legally recognizable 
husbands.  In the context of slave women claiming status as the heirs of 
white men in the South, white women (and their male relatives) who 
claimed status as the legitimate heirs-at-law of those slaveholding men, 
were even further privileged.  They could claim ownership rights over 
slave women beneficiaries and their children. 
Since the slave women’s situation was precarious, their benefactors 
were compelled to use geography as a tool in developing effective legal 
strategies to protect their rights of inheritance: removal from the South 
into Northern free communities gave them status as free women capable 
of filing suits.  The women saw themselves as being on par with white 
women; the men’s behavior gave them that ability.  The women thus 
posed to Southern institutions the danger of social and legal upheaval.  
At the same time, the women distanced themselves from slavery; they 
wanted freedom and the property cultivated from the slave labor of the 
slaves who might have once been their peers.  This change in status 
points then, to the significance of class. 
Of importance in the women’s fight was a diverging American 
legal culture that developed in the antebellum period and contributed to 
this stratification within the population of African Americans.  Slavery 
was dying out in the North and abolitionist fervor there favored the 
women seeking refuge and gaining new status as free women of color.  
Slavery had ended in Massachusetts since the late 18th century, with the 
decision in the Quok Walker cases involving the battery and capture of a 
black man alleged to have been an escaped slave.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court held in Commonwealth v. Jennison that because the Massachusetts 
constitution declared all men free and equal, there could be no slavery in 
the state.47 
 46. Id. at 21-22. 
 47. See, e.g., JOANNE POPE MELISH, DISOWNING SLAVERY: GRADUAL EMANCIPATION AND 
“RACE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1860 1-7 (1998) (discussing slavery’s demise in New England). 
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Gradual abolition was the tendency in the mid-Atlantic, where 
states like New York and Pennsylvania banned the importation of slaves 
and determined that the generation of blacks born during the Early 
American Republic (the 1780s) would spend their youth as “servants” to 
their parents’ masters and become free as they reached adulthood.48  In 
these states, then, slavery was becoming less and less common as the 
older generations of slaves died.49  The states of the old Northwest 
Ordinance had their own appeal, like Ohio, where slavery had been 
banned pursuant to federal statute.  Ohio was a free state that bordered 
various slave states like Kentucky and Virginia.  It was also along the 
Mississippi river, a conduit for those masters living in the states along its 
southern borders. 
Successful claimants then relied upon a confluence of geographical 
factors in combination with shrewd strategy: living in the North as free 
women, they were in a position to fight for property rights in their home 
states.  This strategy contained detriments, notwithstanding the benefits 
of freedom.  These were free women of color in the North who faced 
hostility within their home states of the South.  They dared not return 
home.  As a result, they could only protect their interests from afar, 
which limited the effectiveness of their struggle to gain the property they 
believed themselves entitled to receive. 
In the North then, the women were members of the population of 
free people of color; this community was developing into an antebellum 
elite.  Recognizing that slavery endangered all blacks in the United 
States, leaders in the community were ardent abolitionists.  These were 
people with freedom of movement, the right to own property and with 
corresponding rights to protect their property.  Thus, the women could 
use the Northern courts as a sword against Southern jurisdictions.  
Nonetheless, in a state like Ohio, they experienced difficulties placed 
upon them by law in white communities fearful of free blacks. 
Ohio, as one of the first states to be brought into the Union under 
the old Northwest Ordinance, was caught between two ideals: freedom 
versus slavery.  According to the Ordinance, slavery could not exist 
within the jurisdiction, which caused tensions from the very beginning.  
If Ohio was to become a free state, how then should it relate to its 
slaveholding neighbors in a state like Kentucky?  Did the ideal of 
freedom mean then that the entire state supported the rights of blacks to 
 48. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:  SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 71-72 
(Morris S. Arnold ed., The University of North Carolina Press 2000) (1981). 
 49. See id. at 42-45. 
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remain free from slavery and its corresponding race-based 
subordination? 
The evidence indicates that Ohio did not escape slavery’s taint.  Not 
only were many early Ohioans from southern states, but many were 
reliant upon financial and social ties to its slaveholding neighbors to the 
south.  These Ohioans tended to support the rights of slaveholders and 
the return of fugitive slaves, which had been authorized by the 
Constitution: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws 
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but 
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or 
Labour may be due. 50 
Thereafter, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  It 
authorized the executive officers of each state to seek their 
corresponding officers in other states to have runaway slaves arrested 
upon an indictment or an affidavit sworn before a magistrate.  The 
escapees could then be transferred to their states of origin or brought 
before a magistrate, and upon the slaveholder claimant’s successful 
prosecution of the matter, s/he could be given an order permitting 
removal of the enslaved person.  On the other hand, the Act indicated 
that tensions were already brewing between slaveholders in the South 
and their northern neighbors who opposed slavery.  Those who sought to 
prevent and interfere with a claimant’s removal of a fugitive slave could 
be fined $500 and jailed for a year in prison.  This tension became 
exacerbated over time as Northern states in turn passed their own 
personal freedom laws in the hope of protecting those alleged to have 
been fugitives. 
Thus, Ohioans were in a paradox: some wanted to protect fugitives, 
while others did not.  In 1819, for example, the legislature passed a 
statute making it a crime to remove free blacks, with a particular 
emphasis on violence, fraud or deception.51  Free blacks were in danger 
not only of being charged as fugitive slaves, but free blacks who were 
not fugitives could be kidnapped.  On the other hand, the Black Laws of 
1804 could be quite protective of slaveholder’s rights, in the form of 
support for the fugitive slave laws; the statute set forth that any person 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 51. Stephen Middleton, The Black Laws:  Race and the Legal Process in Early Ohio, in OHIO 
UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES ON LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN THE MIDWEST 52 (Paul Finkelman 
ed., 2005). 
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who prevented an owner’s recapture of a fugitive could be fined.52  
Nothing in the statute indicated that blacks could testify in their 
defense.53 
The Black laws were especially pernicious, insofar as they provided 
a further basis for limiting blacks’ civil rights within the state of Ohio, 
notwithstanding their legitimate free status.  They could not vote, could 
not testify against whites, and could not serve on juries.  In order to 
remain in the state, they needed certificates from freedom signed by a 
court—any court in the United States—certifying their free status.  By 
1807, they needed to file a $500 bond for good behavior.54  Supporters 
of the acts argued that they acted as a deterrent to black immigration into 
the state, in protection of free white labor.  Opponents responded that 
they posed a danger instead to free blacks.  The laws generated the high 
drama to be found in Ohio antebellum courtrooms over social and legal 
struggles between abolition and support for slavery.  Denied rights to 
testify against whites, how could a black person in Ohio protect himself 
if a Southerner claimed him a runaway slave?  How could blacks protect 
themselves from wrongful accusations and file lawsuits when they were 
wronged?  How could they prevent kidnapping at the hands of 
unscrupulous whites?  Prior to their repeal in 1849, the Black laws did 
not help them any.55 
If anything, the Black laws indicate further the significance of race 
and class in “women’s legal history,” highlighting the ways in which 
black women could be disempowered as a matter of law.  Mixed-race 
slave women were not always privileged by their ties to whiteness.  If 
they had been enslaved, they could be returned to slavery if the relatives 
who owned them would deny them freedom, and when they were “free 
people of color,” they could be denied access to public education if they 
did not look “white enough.”  A light-skinned mixed-race slave woman, 
Matilda Lawrence, from Missouri, accompanied her slave owner father 
in 1836 on trips into the North.  She expressed an interest in becoming 
free, but he refused to manumit her.  Easily passing as a white woman, 
she escaped into Cincinnati and found employment.  Her father hired a 
professional slave catcher to capture her.  Upon being apprehended, she 
 52. Id. at 49. 
 53. See, e.g., Nikki M. Taylor, Frontiers of Freedom: Cincinnati’s Black Community 1802 - 
1868, in OHIO UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES ON LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN THE MIDWEST 205 
(Paul Finkelman ed., 2005) (for a copy of the Black Laws, 5 Ohio Laws 63 (1804)). 
 54. Id. (for a copy of Black Laws of 1807, 8 Ohio Laws 53 (1807)). 
 55. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 51, at 132, 197. 
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was charged as a fugitive under the Act of 1793, and eventually removed 
from Cincinnati.56 
Not only did the Black laws threaten blacks’ interest in freedom 
and escaping from slavery, but it also denied them the chance to have 
their children educated in the public schools.  These were for white 
children only.  Thus, black children were to be educated privately.  But 
those mixed-race black children who appeared “white” could go to 
school with whites, as happened in the case of the Williams family, 
headed by an octoroon man married to a white woman.  He was of 1/8 
black ancestry—one of his eight great-grandparents was black.  Socially, 
the couple was taken to be white by all who knew them, but when they 
hoped to enroll their children in a local public school, they were barred, 
until the Ohio Supreme Court clarified what it meant to be “white.”  
Whiteness was not limited to ancestry, but to appearance.  The children 
appeared white, their parents lived in a white world; for the purposes of 
school enrollment, the children were white.57 
The cases brought by formerly enslaved free women of color and 
their children for inheritances did not involve the drama of communities 
caught between abolitionist fervor and pro-slavery sentiment as found in 
the fugitive slave cases and the earlier cases which challenged the Black 
laws.  It is of great significance, then, that these cases escaped the public 
scrutiny that the other cases generated, and as a result, have not been the 
focus of scholarly inquiry.  They provide, however, another view of 
what abolitionist law practice entailed.  The women were struggling to 
be defined as “free.”  State institutions in their home states had carefully 
defined and proscribed definitions of “family” which did not include 
them.  The relatives of the white men to whom they had biological ties 
never saw them as “family,” but saw them instead as property to be 
owned.  Thus, lawyers and testators had to be resourceful at using legal 
institutions and doctrines. 
Several cases decided by state high courts in the antebellum South 
indicate the existence of this phenomenon of black women’s inheritance 
rights and the use of Ohio legal institutions by newly freed women.58  
These cases are not meant to be exhaustive, but are meant only to be 
instrumental in explaining the means by which formerly enslaved 
women could: claim status as free women of color; establish their status 
 56. Id. at 112-13, 167-68. 
 57. Id. at 86-88 (discussing Williams v. Dir. of Sch. Dist., 1 Wright 578 (Ohio 1834)). 
 58. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (Miss. 1859); Jolliffe v. Fanning, 10 Richardson 186 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1856); Willis v. Jolliffe, 11 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. Ct. App. 1860).  These cases are 
more fully discussed in Jones, supra note 41, at 729-30, 741. 
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as “family,” notwithstanding their white relatives in the South who 
rejected them; and lay a foundation for making claims to the inheritances 
they could never defend in their home jurisdictions.  In making these 
crucial steps towards liberation, each relied upon legal institutions in 
Cincinnati and retained the services of the same abolitionist lawyer: John 
Jolliffe. 
The issue of comity was overwhelmingly significant in determining 
how the cases would be resolved.  Although the Constitution set forth 
that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State,”59 the 
conflict over slavery tested that assertion and promise.  Northerners who 
opposed slavery tended not to recognize slaveholders’ rights to seize as 
fugitives, those blacks who escaped enslavement.  The personal liberty 
laws attested to that and their rejection of comity.  Southerners in turn, 
demanded that Northerners recognize comity and respect their rights to 
hold enslaved property, which they argued was required by the 
Constitution.  As Northerners began to reject comity with respect to 
slaveholders’ rights, Southerners began to reject it too, with respect to 
the rights of former slaves seeking to inherit property in their 
jurisdictions upon becoming free people of color in the North.60 
Nancy Wells of Mississippi was alleged to have been the biological 
daughter of her slave owner father, Edward Wells, who brought her to 
Cincinnati, Ohio in the late 1840s for the purpose of manumitting her 
and enrolling her in a school for black youngsters.  He was unmarried, 
and had no other children.  Nancy’s physical presence in Cincinnati, 
combined with specific procedures to manumit, indicate the process by 
which Southern slave women could become Northern free women of 
color.  She was measured and described, for the purpose of drafting a 
certificate of manumission.  She then stayed in Ohio for two years.  
Several years later, Edward wanted to recognize her among the other 
relatives who were to inherit pursuant to his will.  As a result, he left her 
a bequest.  The white relatives who served as executors and who 
received the bulk of her father’s inheritance did not include her in the 
distribution of bequests, even though she was explicitly named to 
receive $3,000 in cash, a bed, and a watch.61 
Nancy Wells was a young woman in her twenties when she 
initiated her lawsuit for her inheritance; John Jolliffe represented her.  
 59. U.S. CONST. art IV. § 1. 
 60. See, e.g., FINKELMAN, supra note 48 (discussing comity). 
 61. Complaint at 7-8, Mitchell v. Wells, No. 8612 (Ch. Court Madison Co., Miss., 1857).   
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As a free woman of color, she claimed her right under the will to be 
defined as family, and used her father’s behavior as evidence to establish 
her status.  The bequest failed, however, because the state of Mississippi 
refused to recognize her as having rights to use their courts of law.  Her 
father did not fulfill the requirements to manumit in the state, and it was 
immaterial that Ohio recognized her as a free woman of color.  It was 
not in Mississippi’s interest to do the same.  In the state’s view, her 
temporary sojourn in Ohio which ended in her return to Mississippi, 
where slavery was the primary status held by most blacks, indicated that 
the manumission in Ohio was a sham.  The real intent was to have her 
remain in Mississippi, where she was not recognized as a free woman of 
color.  Once Nancy realized that she could be claimed as a slave, she 
returned to Ohio, but without the inheritance to which she thought she 
was entitled.62 
Amy Willis was more successful, however, in her attempt to gain 
an inheritance.  She was from Barnwell, South Carolina and was alleged 
to have been the longtime partner of Elijah Willis, a planter, whose 
relationship with her was well known in their community.  Like Wells, 
Willis was unmarried; he hoped to recognize Amy and their children in 
his will as comprising his legitimate family, something which the 
official law of slavery did not permit.  Recognizing that South Carolina 
law had made it impossible for owners to manumit slaves in the state 
and leave them bequests of property, Elijah planned to liquidate and 
move to Ohio.  But if he died in the meantime, he wanted his executors 
to take Amy and the children out of the state. 
Elijah Willis intended to write a will in Ohio and manumit in that 
state.  It is unclear why settling in Ohio appealed to him.  As noted 
earlier, by this time, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania were 
also free states.  Perhaps it was a matter of geographical preference?  
Ohio was a younger state, compared to those of the Northeast; it was still 
considered part of the “frontier,” a place which beckoned to migrants 
with the hope of starting anew.  This appeared to be what Elijah 
envisioned: he hoped to buy a farm there and settle with Amy and the 
children.  He arrived in Cincinnati in February of 1854, and went around 
asking for the name of a lawyer to help him.  John Jolliffe, as a well-
known abolitionist lawyer, was suggested as an ideal choice; those 
knowledgeable of Jolliffe’s practice pointed Willis in his direction.  The 
will was drafted in Ohio on February 23, 1854.  Pursuant to that will, 
Amy and her children were to inherit his full estate.  A year later, in May 
 62. Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 236. 
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of 1855, he returned with Amy, the children, and her mother with the 
intention of settling them there.  But he died upon arrival.  He was then 
brought to the Dumas house and eventually buried in a black cemetery.63 
The Dumas House, according to Taylor, was “the best-known 
black-owned boarding house in Cincinnati,”64 and a station on the 
Underground Railroad.  Was Willis brought there upon his collapse, and 
not to a white hotel because of the nature of his lifestyle?  He was 
traveling with his black partner, Amy Willis, and their mixed race 
children.  Her partner was dead, and she was the person to vouch for his 
identity.  She was the one who had to deal with the lawyers and fight to 
gain her inheritance.  She retained Jolliffe, who admitted the will to 
probate in Cincinnati; he served as the executor. 
When Jolliffe tried to probate the Ohio will in South Carolina, 
Willis’ white relatives balked.  Not only was there an older will drafted 
in 1846 that made them his beneficiaries, but if the will were void, as the 
heirs-at-law, they would inherit as a matter of law.  In their view, Amy 
and her family could never be legitimate beneficiaries.  They claimed the 
will was void, and Jolliffe, as the executor of a void will, had no right to 
act.  Thus, Jolliffe was the defendant in the first of two suits in South 
Carolina involving Elijah Willis’ will.  Pursuant to the 1856 decision, 
Jolliffe v. Fanning,65 the will was valid.  Willis was of sound mind; he 
had a plan in place to fulfill his desires to distribute his property, 
notwithstanding his rejection of the white relatives who laid claim to the 
estate. 
In round two, Jolliffe was sued again, on the basis that he could not 
probate the will and distribute to Amy and her children, because they 
were still slaves.  In this second action, the justices found that Willis 
intended that Amy, her children, and her mother, would remain in Ohio.  
It was irrelevant that he had not fulfilled his purpose to set them up in 
freedom prior to his death.  By bringing them to a free state where he 
had made up a will designating them as beneficiaries, he made it clear to 
everyone that they were all to become free.  Moreover, because Ohio did 
not recognize slavery within its borders, it was in its rights to recognize 
them as free people of color.  As free people of color then, they were to 
inherit within South Carolina, even though they were not living there.66 
In addition to representing private clients in matters of 
manumission and inheritance, Jolliffe had been known to handle high 
 63. Willis, 11 Rich. Eq. at 447. 
 64. Taylor, supra note 53, at 195. 
 65. Jolliffe v. Fanning, 10 Richardson 186, 186 (S.C. Ct. App. 1856). 
 66. Willis, 11 Rich. Eq. at 447. 
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profile cases involving the fugitive slave laws; the more notorious of 
which, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, further threatened the civil rights 
of all blacks in the state.  The first Act generated its own controversy in 
the state, as evidenced by Ohio’s legislative acts supporting “personal 
liberty.”  But the Act of 1850 was passed and enforced during a time 
when anti-slavery tensions were at a high point, in an effort to appease 
the demands of Southerners who objected to Northerners’ refusal to 
respect comity and return fugitive slaves. 
Recognizing that state courts and state officials had become 
unreliable because they refused to follow the provisions of the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1793, the Act removed jurisdiction over such matters to 
federal marshals and included more stringent punishments of those who 
would practice civil disobedience.  Most controversial though, was that 
the Act required local whites to aid the federal marshals working on the 
behalf of Southern owners and their agents in capturing alleged 
fugitives.  Local whites were to turn in their friends and neighbors.  If 
they obstructed the efforts of claimants, harbored individuals known to 
be fugitives, or aided them in escaping their owners, they could be fined 
$1000.00 or face a jail term of six months or less.  They could also be 
held liable for civil damages of $1000.00 per lost fugitive.  Those 
accused of being fugitives had no right to testify on their behalf, and 
commissioners received a higher fee for every order of repatriation: 
$10.00, as compared to $5.00 when there was no proof of the claim.67  
This provided, then, an incentive to find on behalf of owners.  
Abolitionists protested the seizure and threatened repatriation of blacks 
who were accused of being fugitives.  Jolliffe’s role as an abolitionist 
lawyer lay in challenging owners’ prosecutions of those alleged to be 
fugitives, by arguing instead that they were free. 
It is not infeasible that Amy Willis’ case and that of Nancy Wells 
could have eventually involved the fugitive slave laws, where Jolliffe’s 
expertise might have come in handy.  What if the women’s relatives 
claimed they were fugitives, notwithstanding the lawsuits to gain an 
inheritance and their lawyer’s defense of their interests?  It is important 
to note that there were Southern whites who ignored court orders that 
granted blacks rights as free people of color.68  Beyond that, since blacks 
 67. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850). 
 68. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 51, at 216-19; Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the 
Background to the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 671, 677 (2003) 
(discussing the case of the Peyton Polly family, where members of a family of free blacks in Ohio 
were kidnapped into slavery as a result of disgruntled heirs who objected to their former owner’s 
manumission of them in Kentucky, and the difficulties involved in liberating them). 
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could not appear and testify in fugitive slave actions, it was plausible 
that the women were in fear of being kidnapped.  With a kidnapping, 
their cases would have disappeared, and that disappearance would have 
evaporated their claims to an inheritance, ensuring that their benefactors’ 
wealth remained in white hands. 
Amy Willis could definitely have been at risk.  In the earlier last 
will and testament, Elijah Willis had given all his property to various 
heirs, his nieces and nephews.  When Willis’ estate in South Carolina 
was inventoried according to that will, Amy, her children and her mother 
were listed as property of the estate, but located in Ohio.69  It was 
plausible that Elijah’s relatives would have tried to seek and return Amy 
and her children to slavery, when their position all along had been that 
they were not beneficiaries, but property to be divided up among them, 
the heirs-at-law.  More significant though, Amy Willis was at the heart 
of the litigation to determine the legitimacy of the Ohio will.  Because 
the estate was substantial, she stood to inherit a lot of money if it were 
upheld: the personal estate, comprised of movable property and slaves, 
alone was worth about $23,000.70  There might very well have been 
people in South Carolina who would have been quite pleased if she were 
brought back and enslaved. 
Nancy Wells was just as vulnerable.  She was denied an inheritance 
and her claims to legitimate family status were denied.  Moreover, she 
was not a person to be protected by the laws of her home state of 
Mississippi; she was not a daughter worthy of her father’s protection.  
What if she were kidnapped and enslaved by those who objected that she 
dared claim status equal to those of whites in the community?  Would 
she have been protected if her relatives back home claimed her as a 
fugitive?  Mississippi was no longer her home, she was a free woman of 
color living in the North; she might very well have been fearful of what 
they might have done if they ever tried to pursue her. 
Although Amy Willis won both cases, did she really win, or was it 
a pyrrhic victory?  Did merely winning the case guarantee that she 
gained all that she was entitled to?  How could it?  She used Ohio legal 
institutions to establish her legal identity as the heir of her biological 
father.  But did Elijah Willis’ white relatives recognize her as such?  
Their claim all along throughout the litigation was that she was enslaved, 
yet these were the people charged with securing her inheritance once the 
 69. Elijah Willis Estate Papers, Willis v. Joliffe, 11 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. Ct. App. 1860) 
(Bundle No. 126, Package No. 7, 1855 inventory). 
 70. Elijah Willis Estate Papers, Willis v. Joliffe, 11 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. Ct. App. 1860) 
(Bundle No. 126, Package No. 7, Feb. 7, 1861 inventory). 
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litigation ended and she won.  They were in charge of managing all the 
property, real and personal.  She was in Ohio, and could not protect her 
rights from afar as she might have done if she were in South Carolina.  
Her status as a free woman of color limited whether she could go back 
home, because if she returned, who knows what might have happened to 
her.  She might have been kidnapped into slavery or might have 
experienced assault or even murder at the hands of those who resented 
her new status of property owner.  Regardless of her ability to protect 
her interests, she gambled over her ability to win.  Even if she lost, 
though, she was no longer enslaved, and notwithstanding the hardships, 
that liberty was priceless. 
It is important to note that the women’s use of Ohio legal 
institutions didn’t raise the specter of prejudice to the interests of white 
Ohioans and the wrath of the Black laws, not only because the laws had 
been repealed by then, but because they were not suing Ohioans to 
enforce rights as free women of color.  These were not light-skinned 
black women trying to “pass” by forcing Ohio to recognize their ties to 
whiteness as a means of gaining access to white institutions in the state.  
They were not seen as undermining the interests of whites.  The Ohio 
courts were a tool instead for establishing rights in the South, and as 
many abolitionists in Ohio supported the use of local institutions to 
protect the rights of free blacks in the state, the women’s use of local law 
was a courtesy given to previously enslaved Blacks eager to establish 
new lives in the North.  The women’s cases gave abolitionist lawyers in 
the North another means of undermining slavery: establishing enslaved 
women as free women of color meant they could assert rights to 
personhood in jurisdictions where they were never intended to have any.  
Abolitionist lawyers could force a redefinition of Southerners’ notions of 
family by supporting the men’s use of trusts and estates law and 
reinforce the women’s rights to property, through what Davis spoke of 
as the “private law of wills.”71 
As for the women bringing suit, perhaps it was about more than the 
money; their cases were a means of officially validating relationships 
which had long been denied under the official guise of Southern slave 
law.  But that did not mean that the money didn’t matter.  Nancy Wells’ 
father had her trained as a seamstress.  The $3,000 she was to inherit 
from him would have gone a long way towards improving her financial 
situation.  Amy Willis, on the other hand, might have needed every 
 71. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 221, 223-28 (1999). 
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penny.  Willis died before he could get their family settled in Ohio; it is 
unclear whether she had access to any funds while there. 
Nancy Wells and Amy Willis were free, they had to make a new 
life for themselves, but it was not as though they were going to “rest on 
their laurels.”  However, they had a point to make.  They knew who they 
were, the partners and biological children of their owners.  To that 
extent, they shared an interest with their abolitionist lawyers in making a 
greater point.  The men’s wills explained their status, but their white 
relatives refused to recognize them.  The law reinforced that perspective 
because there was no obligation under law for the whites to do so.  But 
in escaping from slavery and gaining the ability to sue in the courts of 
their home states, they reinforced their humanity, gave themselves a 
legal identity, forced recognition of their status, and gained property 
rights, even though these might have been on “paper only” and thus 
difficult to enforce. 
This ability to establish legal personhood was of particular 
importance, because of the specific ways in which women experienced 
gender in the antebellum United States.  White as well as black women 
did not have political rights, but white women could have legal rights.  
As James Horton notes, free men of color were able to assert the 
language of manhood and masculinity in their efforts to gain rights equal 
to white men, and their political strategies, from the time of the 
Revolution, reinforced that interest in gaining freedom, property rights 
and the franchise: “Despite their significant presence in the American 
revolutionary forces, there were several early indications that the federal 
government did not consider them full citizens . . . Nor did the 
Constitution protect free blacks from limitations imposed by the 
individual states.”72 
While elite middle class white women espoused the ideal of the 
“cult of true womanhood” that celebrated security in marriage, 
domesticity, and protection from the public sphere, free black women 
fought to establish themselves as “women.”  King explains that during 
this time period, literate free black women in the North were engaged in 
a battle to define their own images: “[W]omen responded to 
misrepresentations about their manners and morals.  These women 
shaped and adhered to their own standards of beauty, dress and behavior 
in defining womanhood in ways that sometimes challenged society’s 
 72. JAMES OLIVER HORTON, FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR: INSIDE THE AFRICAN AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 150-51 (1993). 
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expectations and beliefs about them.”73  Cases such as those discussed in 
this article can be seen as another means of women shaping their own 
images, as partners and daughters worthy of protection.  These women 
did not leave behind written records, but their behavior, as indicated by 
filing lawsuits and explaining their stories, all in pursuit of an 
inheritance, put their histories into the public record. 
III. FORMULATING AN ABOLITIONIST LAW PRACTICE: JOHN JOLLIFFE 
Abolitionists came in different stripes, depending upon how they 
chose to prove their commitment to their cause, and the abilities they 
brought to their work.  The fugitive slave cases are traditionally seen as 
the venue where abolitionist lawyers did the most work, at the front lines 
in fighting for freedom, when a judge’s decision could result in a person 
gaining freedom or being returned to enslavement.74  But what matters 
too, is that abolitionist lawyers could prove their dedication in other 
ways too: fighting to protect and gain property rights for the newly 
freed.  In a legal system where property rights were the hallmark of 
freedom, protecting them was of paramount importance, and especially 
for those newly freed who were starting their new lives with little or no 
resources. 
Who was John Jolliffe, and how did he become an abolitionist 
lawyer?  Jolliffe was born in Frederick County, Virginia in 1803.  His 
parents were William Jolliffe and Rebecca Neill.  According to Stephen 
Weisenburger, his was a Quaker family that had long abandoned slave 
owning.75  He studied law under St. George Tucker in Winchester, 
graduated and was admitted to practice thereafter.  In 1830, he moved 
westward, and opened a law practice in Batavia, the county seat of 
Clermont County, Ohio.  He worked as a “prosecuting lawyer” for the 
county from 1833-1837 and 1839-1841; during this period, he became 
an associate of Salmon P. Chase “in resisting the famous ‘Fugitive Slave 
Law.’”76  This type of practice did not endear him to his community: 
“Finding that the courts of Brown and Clermont Counties were 
prejudiced against him because of his very pronounced antislavery 
 73. KING, supra note 38, at 34. 
 74. See, e.g., STEPHEN MIDDLETON, OHIO AND THE ANTISLAVERY ACTIVITIES OF ATTORNEY 
SALMON PORTLAND CHASE, 1830 -1949 114, 116, 118, 125, 127 (1990). 
 75. STEPHEN WEISENBURGER, MODERN MEDEA:  A FAMILY STORY OF SLAVERY AND CHILD-
MURDER FROM THE OLD SOUTH 91 (1998). 
 76. WILLIAM JOLLIFFE, HISTORICAL, GENEALOGICAL, AND BIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
JOLLIFFE FAMILY OF VIRGINIA, 1652-1893 115 (1893). 
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views,”77 he dissolved his law partnership and moved to Cincinnati in 
1841. 
Jolliffe wrote two novels that indicate to some extent, his 
sentiments on slavery, and as intellectual histories, they offer some 
insight into what mattered to him as an abolitionist.78  A study of such 
materials can indicate the nature of his perspectives, especially when the 
primary source documents are limited.79  In a recent article, Daniel 
Wickberg writes of the significance to be found in the “history of 
sensibilities” arguing that historians should think about using literary 
texts that signify the “terms of representation, the generalized values and 
modes of perception and feeling in which various objects could be 
conceived and represented.”80  Within literary studies, this has been 
described as a “new historicism and cultural materialism,” which 
“share[s] a common preoccupation with the relationship between 
literature and history, and share[s] an understanding of texts of all kinds 
as both products of and functional components of social and political 
formations.”81 
In the nineteenth century, sentimentalism provided an “underlying 
epistemological, moral, and aesthetic framework for comprehending 
reality” and as a rhetorical tool, it was used by antislavery writers, as an 
important part of liberal Protestant theology.82  Sentimentalism could be 
used to awaken emotions to specific moral themes, as a means of 
swaying an audience.  It was a tool used by Harriet Beecher Stowe in 
writing Uncle Tom’s Cabin, for arguing that the system of Southern 
slavery was a blot upon the nation’s conscience.  For Jolliffe, then, 
literature could be a means of explaining legal themes and justifying a 
social cause he embodied in his legal practice. 
In Belle Scott, the reader is confronted with a panoply of characters 
who were touched by slavery.  From runaway slaves, to slave dealers, to 
owners and abolitionist ministers in the North, counterpoised against 
their brethren in the South.  Aaron, an enslaved man, was imbued with 
 77. Id. 
 78. JOHN JOLLIFFE, BELLE SCOTT; OR, LIBERTY OVERTHROWN!:  A TALE FOR THE CRISIS 
240-41, 340-41 (1856) [hereinafter BELLE SCOTT]; JOHN JOLLIFFE, CHATTANOOGA (1858). 
 79. Not only did his personal papers burn in a fire, but the Hamilton County courthouse also 
experienced fires several times during the course of its history:  during the War of 1812, in 1849, 
and in 1884.  See, e.g., JOLLIFFE, supra note 76, at 116; Steven McQuillin, Hamilton County 
Courthouses, http://www.probatect.org/courtrecords/history.htm (last  visited on Jan.7, 2008). 
 80. Daniel Wickberg, What is the History of Sensibilities?:  On Cultural Histories, Old and 
New, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 662 (2007). 
 81. JOHN BRANNIGAN, NEW HISTORICISM AND CULTURAL MATERIALISM 3 (1998). 
 82. Wickberg, supra note 80, at 662-63. 
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Christian faith, a quiet dignity and humility, and a fierce desire for the 
freedom that he knew was his birthright.  His Bible told him slavery was 
wrong, but Southern ministers operated instead as apologists for the 
regime, arguing that a biblically sanctioned system could be a fair one 
for the enslaved.  On his side, though, were the Northern abolitionist 
Christians who hid him in Ohio and tried to protect him from the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. 
In this world of slavery, Southern ministers enslaved men and 
women, claiming that the Northern abolitionist minister was wrong-
headed.  Arguing that slavery could be morally justifiable when owners 
were properly paternalistic and protective of their slaves, slavery fit into 
an ideal social order.  Yet, the slave owners and slave dealers did not 
always listen to their ministers’ advice on protecting the rights of slaves.  
They need not do so, because slavery was supported by law; owners’ 
individual treatment of their slaves was left to their own personal 
conscience, and local courts tended not to interfere with owners’ 
prerogatives.  The abolitionists’ only hope lay in their power to 
persuade.  Perhaps individual slave owners could be urged to turn their 
back on the practice. 
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 pitted Northern abolitionist 
Christians against the force of secular law.  According to their 
interpretation of the Bible, there should be no slavery, because no man 
had the right to own another, and all were God’s children, equal under 
the law.  But the fugitive slave law required them to participate in 
secular legal processes that would return blacks to slavery.  If they knew 
of fugitives but refused to turn them over, they could be charged with 
violating the law.  Thus, Mr. Ives, a lawyer for Mr. Scott of Louisiana, 
retained for the purpose of resolving his client’s estate matters in 
Virginia, was confronted with his conscience: could he as a man of faith 
be the hired gun for slave owners? 
Mr. Scott’s brother died in Virginia, and Mr. Scott was returning to 
probate the estate.  He was the only heir; a daughter had died long 
before, and an enslaved woman, a caregiver, had been charged with her 
murder.  Mr. Ives accompanied Mr. Scott and his daughter Mary on the 
trip back east.  Among Mr. Scott’s slaves in Louisiana was his 
daughter’s companion, a mulatto enslaved woman named Belle, who 
could easily pass for white.  Because of her complexion, she was 
believed to be the enslaved daughter of Mr. Scott from Louisiana.  
Accompanying them on the trip, Belle attempted to escape once they got 
to Ohio, but was captured.  Locals in the community became incensed, 
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enraged that she would be returned to enslavement and denied her 
chance at freedom. 
Mr. Ives experienced a crisis of conscience.  Confronted with an 
enslaved woman determined to become free and in need of legal 
counsel, how did he feel about his role in this matter, that he was 
expected to represent Mr. Scott’s interests?  Upon hearing the persuasive 
arguments of an abolitionist, he became converted to the cause.  He 
realized that he could not stay on the sidelines and he could not represent 
Mr. Scott.  He decided to represent Belle in her attempt to become free, 
running the risk of jeopardizing his legal career, his relationship with his 
client, and his relationship with Mary, his client’s daughter, whom he 
intended to marry.  A whole chapter was dedicated to his anti-slavery 
arguments in favor of Belle’s freedom. 
The inquiry then is, do the acts of 1793, and 1850, forbid any man to 
do anything that the Christian religion enjoins upon him?  [O]r, 
command him to do anything that Christianity forbids?  For if they 
either forbid or command any act inconsistent with loving God with 
the whole heart, and our neighbor as ourselves, they are contrary to the 
true intent and meaning of the [first] amendment, and are nullities.83 
He argued that abolitionists had a first amendment right as a matter 
of freedom of conscience when they opposed slavery.  According to 
their interpretation of the Bible, slavery was wrong and ungodly.  The 
fugitive slave acts, as secular laws, interfered with their freedom of 
conscience because these laws demanded that they ignore their religious 
beliefs and cooperate with a system that undermined and opposed those 
beliefs.  On that basis, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was 
unconstitutional, and individual abolitionists should not be forced to 
obey.  Finally, he argued, it was questionable whether Belle really was a 
slave.  
Aaron, the enslaved man, once had a Bible owned by his partner, an 
enslaved woman named Minte, who was caretaker for the daughter of 
the Virginia-based Mr. Scott.  Accused of killing the child, she was 
tortured, whipped into confessing, and tried before a panel of 
magistrates.  The magistrates found her guilty and sentenced her to hang.  
But before her death, she wrote into a Bible all she recalled of the child 
and the circumstances of her disappearance.  Belle shared various 
physical characteristics of the child described.  Although the information 
in the Bible was inadmissible in court, other evidence from slave traders 
 83. BELLE SCOTT, supra note 78, at 240-41. 
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and whites living in the community at the time, indicated that Belle 
indeed was the long-lost white niece of her owner, Mr. Scott of 
Louisiana.  She had been kidnapped into slavery.  As a result of this 
kidnapping, her uncle was able to claim her father’s entire estate.  
Confronted with the evidence of his treachery, the uncle, Mr. Scott, 
relinquished all claims to the property.  Belle inherited and manumitted 
all those enslaved. 
Mr. Ives, the former lawyer for slaveholders in Louisiana married 
Mary Scott.  The couple decided that they would live in the North.  They 
turned their back on their heritage as Southerners who supported and 
profited from slavery.  Their slaves were liberated: 
They were not turned out among strangers, to begin the world for 
themselves without the means of a comfortable subsistence.  They 
were brought to a free state, and there, upon well-stocked farms that 
Mary and her husband carefully aided them in selecting, were all 
settled.  School-teachers, and the means of religious education were 
provided for them . . .84 
Did Jolliffe see himself as a Mr. Ives?  He was a Southerner, born 
in Virginia, who left as a young man to seek his fortune elsewhere.  Why 
did he turn his back on the culture of slavery that his state promoted?  
Did he do so because of his religious heritage?  Had he hoped to live in a 
new place where slavery would not be part of the culture?  In his view, 
did the Southern culture of slavery threaten to overrun the Northern 
states through the tentacles of the fugitive slave laws?  Did he see 
himself as a bulwark against that? 
Jolliffe, as an abolitionist lawyer, arguably applied notions of 
sentimentalism in representing enslaved women like Nancy Wells and 
Amy Willis.  Although they were similar to the fictional Belle, neither of 
the women were white, and they could not pass for white women.  
Nancy was the biological daughter of her slave owner father.  Amy was 
her owner’s long-term partner.  Nancy Wells and Amy Willis were not 
white women put into slavery, a trope guaranteed to inflame the passions 
of men who saw white women as deserving of chivalric protection.  
Nonetheless, Jolliffe’s arguments that these mixed-race black women 
were daughters and partners pushed them into the category of women 
worthy of protection.  The white men who owned them, their fathers and 
partners, were dead, and they were left vulnerable in a world where they 
had no protection.  Their white relatives were the threat. 
 84. Id. at 341. 
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It is important to emphasize too that these specific biological ties to 
whiteness placed the women into a different class from other enslaved 
women.  Contrary to whites like Mr. Ives, who became enlightened to 
abolition, these men—Edward Wells and Elijah Willis—did not intend 
to liberate all the enslaved people they owned.  Thus, the women were 
placed in a potential class conflict with the other enslaved people owned 
by the men, through their use of Ohio legal institutions.  They were to 
become free, but not all the others would join them in liberty.  Moreover, 
they could feasibly inherit enslaved property, or property earned through 
enslaved labor.  In each case, their white relatives threatened their liberty 
and right to property by protesting the arrangements the men made for 
them in their wills.  If the women did not inherit but remained in their 
home states, they would have remained enslaved.  As Northern women 
in Ohio, they could live in freedom, whether or not they received their 
inheritance. 
But that did not mean that they could easily forget their former 
slave status.  Not only had they once been slaves, but as Horton notes, 
“[since] by 1860, four million blacks were slaves and only a half million 
were free, it was likely that every free black person had a friend of 
family member in bondage.”85  One can argue further, that the fugitive 
slave laws made the threat of enslavement real, regardless of one’s free 
status.  The times were just too precarious.  Taylor explains that class 
divides were of less importance in cities like Cincinnati.86  There were 
not many inordinately wealthy blacks, of whatever background: mixed 
race or not.  Prior to their repeal in 1849, the Black laws made all blacks 
unequal to whites in their community, and the fugitive slave laws 
threatened everybody’s liberty.  An interest in abolition and a desire to 
protect themselves from the greater threats outside of the community 
forged a sense of cohesion, she suggests.87  This sense of cohesion 
meant that free blacks had more in common with blacks of 
grounds. 
But although women like Nancy Wells and Amy Willis were 
arguably elite by nature of their status as free women of color, especially 
in comparison to enslaved women, they were not elite in the traditional 
sense of status linked through class to wealth.  At the start, they were not 
women of independent means.  Neither of them became wealthy upon 
their manumission; they had to work to support themselves, particularly 
 85. HORTON, supra note 72, at 160. 
 86. Taylor, supra note 53, at 104. 
 87. Id. 
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 named Manuel Ash.  He 
work
  
Without information from the public records, less is known about them. 
 Jolliffe were 
able 
, the emancipations and wills, were an important part of his 
practice: 
 
since their bequests were caught up in probate.  Nancy Wells, for 
example, worked as a seamstress.88  By the time of the 1870 census, 
Amy Willis was married to a mulatto man
ed in a brickyard and she kept house.89 
These cases point to the possible existence of other women who 
were similar to Nancy Wells and Amy Willis, in that they also inherited 
money and property from white male slaveholding partners and fathers, 
but not much is known about them.  Taylor suggests there were wealthy 
free women of color who might have been given money from white 
partners and fathers in the South prior to their deaths, in order to start 
anew in the North.90  Women in that category might not have required 
the intervention of Southern probate courts or even of the Ohio courts, 
and as a result, those women might not have experienced the difficulties 
Nancy Wells and Amy Willis did in trying to gain their inheritances.
IV. CONCLUSION 
Recently published social and legal histories have focused on the 
fugitive slave cases, in an effort to understand the complexities of race in 
an antebellum Northern state like Ohio and its significance as an aspect 
of abolitionist legal practice.  But the fugitive slave cases, although they 
have garnered the most attention, due to their dramatic nature, did not 
fully encompass all the attention of abolitionist lawyers.  The private law 
cases mattered too, and they could be just as significant for the lawyers’ 
practice.  Private law cases like those involving Edward Wells and Elijah 
Willis and their interest in manumitting their enslaved partners and 
children, involved clients concerned about family matters.  These cases 
provided another means of undermining slavery in the South.  They flew 
in the face of Southern legal practices that would deny manumission and 
equality to enslaved people because Northern lawyers like
to use local institutions to circumvent Southern laws. 
Steven Weisenburger once noted that these types of cases handled 
by Jolliffe
 88. According to the 1860 census, Nancy Wells was known as Nancy Watts.  She lived in the 
household of a black family headed by Thomas Colson and worked as a seamstress.  Census place:  
Cincinnati Ward 15, Hamilton, Ohio; Roll M653_977; page 323; image 38.  Source: 
http://www.ancestry.com. 
 89. According to the 1870 census, Manuscript Census returns, Clermont County Ohio, Ohio 
Twp, National Archives Microform Series M-653, roll 944, page 17. 
 90. Taylor, supra note 53, at 135. 
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When Southern masters strode down the steamboat ramps leading 
slaves (often young mulatto women, sometimes with their children) 
brought North for emancipation, dockmen and passersby sent them to 
Jolliffe.  Jolliffe drew up the documents and guided the masters and 
their former slaves through the city’s Probate Court.  He took the 
money of slaveholders only in those cases.  Otherwise, he reviled them 
. . .91 
Cases like those involving the inheritance rights of Nancy Wells 
and Amy Willis, provide, then, some context for the nature of his 
practice, and offers a fuller understanding of it.  When the owners 
contributed indirectly to the abolitionist cause of ending slavery, by 
manumitting their slaves, Jolliffe supported their interests fully.  But 
when they opposed his interest in manumission, he fought them.  The 
money from his private clients paid for the worthy causes of abolition. 
Edward Wells and Elijah Willis funded the fugitive slave cases that 
Jolliffe dedicated himself to, cases which more often than not, he 
handled on a pro bono basis.  The former category of cases did not 
garner the attention of the public as much as the fugitive slave cases, but 
that does not mean they did not matter.  If anything, they probably 
provided a respite from the drama.  The high drama of the fugitive slave 
act cases pushed him into the public eye and left him open to scorn and 
violence, not only from owners resentful of his practice, but from 
Northern pro-slavery advocates. 
By the time the first of Willis cases was decided in 1856, Jolliffe 
probably needed a break.  Earlier that year, he was the attorney for 
Margaret Garner, the defendant in a well-known fugitive slave case.  
Escaping from slavery in Kentucky with her partner, Robert Garner, 
their children Thomas, Samuel, Mary and Priscilla, and his parents Mary 
and Simon, they were captured in Cincinnati, Ohio.  But before Margaret 
Garner could be taken, she slit the throat of the three year old Mary, 
gashed the boys to the throat and head, and bashed the infant Priscilla 
with a shovel.92 
The violence horrified; that alone could result in Margaret Garner 
being charged with murder in the state of Ohio.  But the case was 
complicated by the Garner family’s status as fugitives.  Were they free 
people of color?  If they were, could they be charged under Ohio law?  
On the other hand, if they were not free, they could be sent back to 
slavery and the control of their owner.  Jolliffe claimed that earlier brief 
 91. WEISENBURGER, supra note 75, at 90. 
 92. Id. at 62, 72-73. 
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and consensual visits to Ohio established that all the adults had become 
free, and that the children were free because they were born after those 
visits.  It had long been a strategy of abolitionist lawyers to argue that 
owners who permitted their slaves to enter free states lost the right to 
keep them in bondage; mere consensual presence in a state where 
slavery did not exist meant the owners waived their rights to retain their 
slaves.93 
That tactic failed in the Garners’ situation, however.  Granted, 
Margaret Garner had once gone to Cincinnati as a child, and the others 
went there regularly as adults as they conducted their owner’s business, 
none of them ever attempted to assert that they had become free, and 
none had ever resisted returning to slavery at the end of their sojourns.  
This was fatal to the Garners’ case.  Their owner permitted them to enter 
the state, but they returned to Kentucky, waiving their rights to claim 
free status. Ohio, in barring slavery within its limits, intended not to bar 
the rights of slave owners temporarily in the state with their slaves, but 
to deny the right of those residents who would own slaves in the state.94  
So in the end, Jolliffe lost, and the Garners returned to slavery.  Not only 
did Jolliffe lose the case, but he was assaulted by Archibald Gaines, 
Garner’s owner.  Visiting Covington, Kentucky, across the border from 
Cincinnati, Gaines saw him, and began yelling at him and hitting him.  
He could have been lynched at the hands of irate slave owners and 
sympathizers to slavery who objected to his practice: “A deputy U.S. 
marshal drew his six-shooter, warned off the crowd, and guided Jolliffe 
back down Madison Street to the riverfront.”95 
The cases he handled for Edward Wells and Elijah Willis, on behalf 
of Nancy Wells and Amy Willis, were of a different ilk.  Contrary to 
Nancy Wells and Amy Willis, Margaret Garner was not a favored slave 
to be sent out of the South, emancipated in the North and given a share 
of an estate.  Weisenburger has argued that instead, she was abused and 
sexually exploited.  In all likelihood, she provided sexual services: with 
the exception of her first child, all of her children were noted to be light 
skinned and almost white.  Each of her pregnancies coincided with those 
of her owner’s wife.96  But during that time, her “husband” Robert had 
been hired out and did not live on the plantation.  Yet, the fiction of her 
“marriage” provided room to explain away her children’s paternity. 
 93. See, e.g., FINKELMAN, supra note 48 (discussing comity and the circumstances under 
which blacks were deemed free by Northern jurisdictions). 
 94. WEISENBURGER, supra note 75, at 90. 
 95. Id. at 5. 
 96. Id. at 44. 
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This legal fiction masked what might have been the true reality, one 
noted by Adrienne Davis, that slave women’s work and home spaces 
coincided, in that they worked in their homes and their homes were sites 
of dominance and control, where they were subject to sexual harassment 
and abuse.97  According to Weisenburger, Margaret Garner was one of 
the few young female slaves on Gaines’ plantation; she might have been 
responsible then, for domestic chores in the household.  As a young 
woman who was regularly pregnant, she might have had wet nurse 
responsibilities too.  As a young fertile woman, she birthed slaves for the 
plantation and increased her owner’s wealth.  By murdering her child, 
she killed a source of his wealth and protected her child from 
experiencing the abuse she did. 
Those in the pro-slavery camp perceived it was immoral for her to 
kill her children, but it was not immoral for her to be in slavery.  Pro-
slavery apologists argued the old trope of a benevolent institution 
undermined by abolitionists who stirred up slaves’ discontent.  But what 
of those instances when enslavement was not benevolent?  This was the 
message abolitionists tried to convey: that desperate slaves could be 
pushed to desperate measures because of slavery’s despotism.  Margaret 
Garner might have had scars from violence she experienced at the hands 
of her owner, and she might have been sexually abused, notwithstanding 
her “marriage.”  Lucy Stone, the well-known abolitionist, spoke of her 
observations and indicated why for some Garner was justified in her 
actions: 
The faded faces of the negro children tell too plainly to what 
degradation the female slaves submit.  Rather than give her little 
daughter to that life, she killed it.  If in deep maternal love she felt the 
impulse to send her child back to God, to save it from coming woe, 
who shall say she had no right to do so?98 
The different experiences among Nancy Wells, Amy Willis, and 
Margaret Garner, the ways in which their legal claims were framed, 
relate back to their corresponding slave owners: the men’s sense of 
morality determined their behavior and affected the women’s fortunes.  
Although it is impossible to know the women’s true feelings in these 
matters, the men’s actions provided cues for the women’s behavior, 
whether they were seeking to defend a will and gain an inheritance or 
run away.  Edward Wells was the father of a slave he wished to protect.  
 97. Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 457-78 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). 
 98. WEISENBURGER, supra note 75, at 173. 
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Elijah Willis presented himself as a white man with a black female 
partner, raising mixed-race children.  Margaret Garner’s owner was her 
motivation for fleeing.  Her desperation to escape slavery and ensure her 
children would never live under it, forced her to an extreme measure: 
infanticide.  The three women’s cases, then, point to the vulnerabilities 
of women under patriarchal control imposed by law, and in these 
instances, their vulnerabilities were more pernicious because of the 
intersections of gender with race.  Race denied Nancy Wells’ legal status 
as a daughter and Amy Willis’ legal status as a wife.  Race made it easy 
for Margaret Garner to experience sexual abuse on a regular basis, and 
the law forced her back into slavery once she escaped. 
Wilma King has argued: “the time is now ripe for reconstructing 
the lives of ordinary and extraordinary free black women from a 
historical perspective.”99  It is important too, that scholars of women and 
the law with interests in legal history develop a “critical race feminist 
legal history.”  In considering a “new women’s legal history” that 
addresses race, gender, and class among Southern slave women in the 
antebellum North, it is significant that women like Nancy Wells and 
Amy Willis were not of the well-known abolitionist elite, highly literate 
and politically involved.  These were average women; they didn’t leave 
many records.  They were anonymous in their new communities, but 
they nonetheless comprised an elite class: one created through proximity 
to whiteness and the promise of access to wealth, predicated upon the 
significance of race, gender, and class status, and the ability to go from 
enslaved woman to free woman of color.  Their cases are ones that might 
have escaped the attention of social historians, but they raise issues 
important for legal historians to address in the context of race, gender, 
and families in antebellum America. 
 99. KING, supra at note 38, at 1. 
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